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In line with global political trends aimed at fostering job creation and economic growth through 
increased entrepreneurship, Portugal has committed to invest in ‘embellishing’ its 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. During the period of 2006-2016, policy reforms were implemented, 
with the objective of alleviating the regulatory rigidity entrepreneurs are subject to. Following 
the OECD-Eurostat methodology, together with a cross-comparison with the Netherlands, this 
paper estimates the effectiveness and impact of these reforms in easing such rigidity. This 
estimation found that Portuguese investment paid-off in some areas such as Administrative 
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“Entrepreneurs are simply those who understand that there is little difference between obstacle 
and opportunity and are able to turn both to their advantage” 
Niccolo Machiavelli, 1469-1527 
1. Motivation and Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 2008/09 economic crisis, many of the world countries suffered an 
economic contraction, with decreasing levels of firm creation and increasing ones of youth 
unemployment. During this period, the rationale that entrepreneurial ventures (high-growth 
firms) drive productivity growth, employment, innovation and internationalization1 developed 
and became the subject of policy makers focus, who sought to improve their countries’ 
economic outlook by reforming their entrepreneurial ecosystems. The overall objective of these 
reforms was to embellish the ecosystem’s environment to motivate and attract venture creation, 
of both national and foreign origins. Portugal, among the most crisis-affected European 
countries, was no exception to these global trends and in 2011 publicly requested external 
financial help and in turn agreed to implement specific policies to achieve certain economic 
goals. Among its objectives, structural reforms targeted areas such as Labour Market and 
Framework Conditions. Overall, the regulatory ease in 2015/16 versus that of 2006 was found 
to have been achieved through the successful reforms in Administrative Burdens (entry and 
growth) and Capital/Business Taxes and injured by some unsuccessful ones in Court and Legal 
Framework and Labour Market. 
Although, Portugal has started to demonstrate its ability and further potential to harbour and 
nurture start-ups, on the European entrepreneurial landscape, with Lisbon as the nation’s poster-
child for start-up hub cities, Europe, and thus Portugal by comparison, still fall short to its major 
competitors (North America and Asia) regarding their current level of entrepreneurship and 
innovation. For their ecosystems to further develop and grow, there is a need to identify and 
                                                          




understand the factors that have thus far attracted and/or deterred national and foreign 
entrepreneurs in choosing Portugal. This is the first step to strategizing the fostering of 
entrepreneurial activities, allowing the country to “successfully communicate the value of the 
Portuguese start up ecosystem and define a truly competitive strategy to support its growth” 
(Portuguese Startup Manifesto) by targeting areas in need of interference. It is not only the 
partial identification of these factors, but also the impact and effectiveness of implemented 
policy reforms (throughout 2006 and 2016) in improving them, that this paper aims to estimate. 
Was Portugal successful in reforming its Regulatory Framework? Where did this 
success/failure come from? Why? Which policy areas need more focus and investment? These 
are examples of questions we aim to answer. 
Furthermore, this work intends to contribute to the assessment and /or monitoring of the policy 
impact in other areas, as the methodology may be further used, with the necessary adaption for 
the area of analysis. Also, the lack of studies, practically using the OECD methodology for 
country analysis, also motivated its choice for implementation in this paper. 
The body of the paper consists in the Literature Review present in Section 2. Section 3 shows 
a description of the recent European and Portuguese entrepreneurial contexts and efforts in 
driving up entrepreneurship. The methodology and variables used are presented in Section 4 
and 5, respectively. Finally, from Section 6 onwards the results are presented and discussed. 
2. Literature Review 
The degree of easiness with which companies must deal with a country’s regulation, is among 
the most relevant aspects of an entrepreneurial ecosystem2. According to the literature on the 
subject, the lighter the burden of regulatory requirements of an ecosystem is, the more attractive 
                                                          
2 interconnected entrepreneurial actors, organisations, institutions and processes, which (in)formally coalesce to 
connect, mediate and govern the performance in the entrepreneurial environment (Mason, C. & Brown, R. 2014) 
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it will be for potential entrepreneurs (national or foreign), to found their ventures in such 
ecosystem – other dimensions held constant. On the other hand, harder regulatory burdens, 
represent higher entry barriers for newcomers (through increased fixed costs), which translates 
to less competition (since incumbents are protected by burdensome entry requirements), 
restrictions on innovation, lower rates of enterprise births and ultimately less job prospects. A 
especially important implication for regions where small and medium enterprises (SME) 
account for an average of 2 out of 3 jobs, such as in the EU, or 4 out 5 jobs, as in Portugal.3  
Nonetheless, the regulatory framework alone does not dictate whether entrepreneurs choose a 
location over another. There are other factors that impact entrepreneur’s preference, such as an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem’s access to capital and/or technology, local market conditions or its 
society’s entrepreneurial culture and capabilities. For example, even in an ecosystem with 
above average regulatory rigidity, entrepreneurs may still prefer to operate there, due to its high-
quality-low-cost labour, easy capital access and pro-entrepreneurial culture and institutions. 
Regardless, recent empirical literature has suggested validation of these theoretical 
implications, connecting the reduction of regulatory burdens with firm entry and job creation4. 
According to Branstetter (2010), artificial entry costs deter entrepreneurship and a substantial 
relaxation of entry regulation burdens or costs drives firm entry and job creation. 
Despite this, measuring policy impact or effectiveness presents formidable challenges and 
every endeavour comes with its ‘red flags’. In principle, the go-to method for measuring such 
impact is to evaluate the state of the economy before and after the implementation of policy 
reforms. However, the likely assumption that hidden factors also drive the value changes in the 
indicators reflecting economic outcomes, difficults causal inference. For instances, a decrease 
in youth unemployment may be due to an increase in job creation, ageing of the population or 
                                                          
3 SBA Fact Sheet Portugal, European Commission, 2016 
4 Ciccone et al. 2007 and Klapper et al. 2006 
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even emigration of the young demographic segment. An alternative is to track and assess, the 
indicator values upon which the policy’s objective intends to impact, before and after its 
implementation. Yet, some indicators are not totally accurate due to their method of collection 
and others are to some extent mere proxies of what they measure. The business ownership rate 
of the population measuring the number of entrepreneurs in a country, is also accounting for 
self-proprietors of small scale operations with reduced growth potential and economic 
significance, which do not fit the concept of entrepreneurship (innovative and high-growth). 
In this paper, the estimation of regulatory policy reform impact rests on high-quality, fact-based, 
reliable indicators. Whilst indicator values are trackable and easily observable, the challenge 
lies on their relevance, as seen in the aforementioned caveat. Regardless, efforts have been 
made to overcome such measurement challenge. 
One of the most common empirical approaches to the estimation of regulatory policy reform 
impact, seen throughout many research work, is to use cross-country comparison regarding 
regulatory rigidity and relaxation and check whether or not variations are correlated with some 
measures of economic performance as suggested in Djankov et al. 2002. A significant downside 
to this approach is the endogeneity, and collinearity issues surrounding standard statistical 
tools/models. Which in turn, make correlation alone insufficient to empirically evaluate the 
plausible consequence of regulatory policy reform. 
Despite useful, these approaches do not replace empirical assessment of actual reforms’ impact, 
either because the policy change is too complex to examine through such simplistic methods or 
because the data used for assessment usually captures more than what it is intended to measure. 
Acknowledging these challenges, the research and meetings carried out by the OECD’s 
Entrepreneurship Indicator Programme, EUROSTAT and the US Key Indicator Project5 during 
                                                          
5 OECD, 2003; Wallman et al., 2004; Munoz, 2004 in: Hoffman, A. et al., 2007, “A Framework for Addressing and 
Measuring C”, Entrepreneurship Indicators Steering Group, OECD 
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2005/06, resulted in the establishment of an indicator quality assessment framework. This 
framework allows analysts to filter high quality indicators by evaluating them across three 
dimensions (i) relevance, assesses whether the indicator closely measures what the framework 
condition is supposed to measure and if policy initiatives have a direct or indirect impact on the 
indicator; (ii) accuracy, tests for the data collection method of indicator values, whether it is 
based on observable/quantifiable facts (fact-based, e.g. tax rate), based on observable and 
quantifiable actions (action-based, e.g. implementation of processes) or based on subjective 
evaluation (opinion-based, e.g. surveys). Accuracy is also tested on consistency of countries’ 
collection method and indicators’ (iii) availability, assessed, across countries and over time. 
Afterwards, an overall grade is given to each indicator, A for the top-tier good quality, B for 
the middle acceptable quality and C for the lower one of more questionable quality. 
Overcoming such barriers, the methodology used in this paper is based on that of OECD-
Eurostat Entrepreneurship Indicators Programme (2007) and uses their yearly updated 
suggestions for databases. The time period considered in this paper required data to be collected 
from 2006 to 2016. It is crucial to mention that, only indicators of the highest-quality were used 
to measure the impact of regulatory policy reform, only policy reforms with direct impact on 
indicator values were analysed and policy shift (in)effectiveness is measured by the 
(un)successful relaxation of regulatory burdens reflected in the indicator value changes.  
3. Current European and Portuguese Entrepreneurial Situation 
3.1 The European Entrepreneurship Situation/Context/Stance 
With scattered levels of entrepreneurial activity, innovation capabilities, regulatory rigidity, 
network access, high quality talent and overall competitiveness, Europe still presents barriers 
to entrepreneurship in need of reform. Lagging behind the global pace of new venture creation, 
Europe presents an average rate of Total early-stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA) of only 
8.4% of the adult population, the lowest among the five world regions. With high divergence 
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in TEA levels among member-countries and discrepancies in the level of innovation capabilities 
between Northern and the remaining Europe supporting the evidence of the ‘European divide’.6 
Nonetheless progress is being made through both top-down (i.e. Public actors) and bottom-up 
(i.e. Private actors) initiatives and practices, aimed at fostering entrepreneurial culture and 
improving the ecosystem for such culture to thrive in. Since the Lisbon European Council in 
2000 greater efforts have been made by European policy makers and private agents to promote 
entrepreneurial activity throughout the continent, with government and private sponsored 
programs and policies aimed at guiding and facilitating entrepreneurs through the startup 
development and growth processes. Some prime examples would be the European 
Commission’s Digital Market Strategy or the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme (CIP) aimed at easing start-up, growth and scale-up processes of entrepreneurial 
ventures across borders, by supporting innovation and technological development, offering 
business support services, providing better access to capital, facilitating connection between 
start-ups, networks, ecosystems and their investors and partners. 
Regarding policy intervention we can witness efforts to integrate entrepreneurship in the 
education system or to reduce tax burdens for new ventures, reducing the cost for entrepreneurs. 
For instances, the European Commission’s Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan or the Small 
Business Act comes to mind, which aim to “improve the approach to entrepreneurship in 
Europe, simplify the regulatory and policy environment for SMEs, and remove the remaining 
barriers to their development.” (European Commission, 2012). 
As for private actors, bottom-up networks (e.g. international conferences and summits) have 
been established to gather entrepreneurs and talent, where some go on to engage in policy 
making, (e.g. Pioneers Annual Conference). Platforms for capital access have also been 
                                                          
6 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Global Report, 2016 
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developed (e.g. European Business Angel Week), co-investment funds set up between Business 
Angels and public actors (e.g. European Angels Fund) and a growing number of crowd-funding 
platforms are emerging (WEF, 2014). Furthermore, a mix of public and private actors have also 
come together in contributing to the fostering of entrepreneurship through activities such as the 
Global Entrepreneurship Week, European Young Innovator Forum or Start-up Europe aimed 
at developing, accelerating and connecting local entrepreneurship ecosystems, their networks 
and entrepreneurial cultures. Lastly, the increase in the number of European incubators and 
accelerators, of around 400% between 2007 and 2013 (Salido, E. et al., 2013)7, is also evidence 
that the efforts to drive up the entrepreneurial culture in Europe are paying off. 
3.2 The Portuguese Entrepreneurship Situation/Context/Stance 
According to a European Commission report8 (2012) in Portugal, 51% of the population would 
rather be self-employed (decreasing 20% since 2002), which is most likely reflecting the 
economic recession Portugal was in at the time. The stability of income and employment were 
pointed as the main reasons for such decrease in numbers, reflecting a more risk-averse 
population. Nonetheless, with a slightly lower rate of TEA than the European average (8.4%)9, 
the Portuguese (8.2%), over the years, have become more involved in entrepreneurial activity 
(Table 1), mainly as a population’s response to high unemployment rates, seeing 
entrepreneurship as the go to solution, with 68.8%3 of the population perceiving it as a good 
carrier choice. Nonetheless, only 20.8% of TEA of the Portuguese adult population has started 
the business out of necessity, compared to 77.7% that have started it out of an opportunity. 
Table 1 – Employer Enterprise Birth Rate and TEA, Portugal 
 
                                                          
7 Salido, E., Sabás, M. and Freixas, P. (2013) “The Accelerator and incubator Ecosystem in Europe”, Telefonica 
8 Flash Eurobarometer 354: Entrepreneurship in the Eu and beyond (2012), European Commission, Report 
9 Global entrepreneurship Monitor, Global Report 2016 
Indicators/ Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Employer enterprise birth rate (%) 11,87 12,57 12,48 14,52 14,75 15,91   NA
Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial 
Activity (TEA) - percentage (%)




Meanwhile, the 2008 recession period is still being felt in the economy, with small-and-medium 
enterprises’ employment and value-added still below pre-crisis levels. During the recession 
period, the number of active Portuguese firms and enterprise births decreased dramatically and 
as of 2015 values haven’t recovered to pre-crisis levels (FIG. 1). Still, the improvement is 
noticeable, with contributions from actors across the country’s different sectors. In this context, 
regulatory rigidity at firm entry can be of paramount importance, if we consider the relaxation 





Accordingly, the government and private actors have become focused on entrepreneurship and 
creating a more attractive ecosystem. Following the European 2020 Action Plan, the Portuguese 
government has put forth some measures to facilitate and drive up entrepreneurial activity in 
the national territory under the Portugal 2020 program. Some of these measures include 
providing financial and knowledgeable support in entrepreneurial projects and even fiscal 
incentives such as SIFIDE II, which supports R&D aimed at product, process, program or 
equipment innovation, by relieving tax burdens of R&D costs. Furthermore, a government-
sponsored initiative was launched in 2016, StartUp Portugal, the administration’s strategy for 
fostering the Portuguese entrepreneurial ecosystem. Some of its measures are the Startup 
Momentum and the Startup Voucher, which are basically subsidies provided to recent graduate 
students, for the development of their business ideas. The most recent one, is the Startup Visa 
launched at this year’s Web Summit, aimed at attracting (by facilitating) foreign venture 
creation or relocation to Portuguese territory, with a quick access to a visa for entrepreneurs 
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with innovative ventures. Other measures, include promoting equity crowd-funding and “peer-
to-peer” lending, supporting co-investment funds with business angels (rounding the €60 
Million) and with Venture Capitalists (rounding the €400 Million)10 and fiscal benefits for 
investors in early-stage start-ups. Additionally, the rising Portuguese community of incubators, 
accelerators, business angels and venture capitalist investors, points again to the investment in 
entrepreneurship in Portugal by private actors of its ecosystem. As of 2016, there is a national 
network of 121 incubators, which combined with accelerators go beyond 150, with around 
2 300 start-ups being incubated as of September 2016.11 
As a result, the Portuguese entrepreneurial ecosystem has been under the spotlight by 
entrepreneurship experts, institutions, the media and entrepreneurs themselves. Since 2004, 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor experts have reported a yearly consistent improvement in 
‘entrepreneurship framework conditions’ and regarding taxes and bureaucracy, the same 
experts ranked Portugal second only to Switzerland in 2015, whilst first in entrepreneurial 
education and third for R&D transfer. The Small Business Act Review of 2016 places Portugal 
among the best entrepreneurship scores in the EU. However, it also highlights that corporate 
taxation, political, legal and regulatory stability, transparency and flexibility in labour 
legislation are the Portuguese ecosystem’s three factors considered less attractive by investors. 
Moreover, the country’s capital, Lisbon, was elected the 2015 European Entrepreneurial Region 
of the Year, awarded by the European Committee of the EU Regions, chosen as the host for the 
2016/17/18 Web Summits, and Beta-I, a Portuguese incubator, was elected 2014 biggest start-
up and entrepreneurship promoter by the European Commission’s European Enterprise 
Promotion Awards (EEPA). As expected, international media (e.g. The Guardian, The 
Financial Times, Reuters) has followed the buzz and has been consistently reporting on Portugal 
                                                          
10 Laranjeiro, Ana. (2016) “Startup Portugal: Conheça as 15 medidas para apoiar o empreendorismo”, Jornal de 
Negócios 
11 Snapshot of the Portuguese Startup Community’s activity in 2016, Startup Portugal Infograph, 2016 
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as an attractive destination for entrepreneurs to test and develop their ideas. Even comparing 
Lisbon, to the Californian Silicon Valley or Berlin, one of Europe’s top hubs for startups. 
Nevertheless, Lisbon is the most media undermined European hub, performing better as a start-
up hub than the media would suggest, as perceived by founders.12 
Finally, according to the World Bank’s Doing Business Reports, Portugal has been among the 
top reformers in Europe, especially in regulatory reform, not only due to the constant number 
of yearly-reforms since 2005, but also due to the improvement in its ranking position of the 
World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, going from 113th out of 155 countries, to 33rd 
from 2005 to 2006 and entering the top 30 in 2015, surpassing its pre-crisis rank. But the 
question of how such an improvement was achieved still remains. 
4. Methodology  
In essence, this paper uses the methodology put forth by the OECD-Eurostat (FIG. 2) to perform 
the detailed descriptive analysis of reforms impact, discussed later in this paper, which covers 
regulatory domains such as Administrative Burdens (entry and growth), Court and Legal 
Framework, Labour Market Regulations and Capital/Business Taxes. 









                                                          
12 Startup European Heatmap – Europe Report, 2016 found this to be true via European founders’ survey and 
comparison with media coverage 
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4.2 Policy Reform impact and effectiveness estimation, using OECD-Eurostat 
framework approach – Limitations and Assumptions 
Although the framework’s authors recognize entrepreneurship as a “phenomenon that manifests 
itself through the economy in many different forms with many different outcomes [...]that are 
not additive”, they believe that establishing a framework with relevant, consistent and 
comparable data collection, will support analysts in understanding the dynamic interactions that 
may exist and target policies more accurately (Hoffman, A. et al., 2007).  
The framework identifies three ‘separate, but inter-connected flows’ (FIG.2): (i) determinants, 
which represent the key factors affecting the (ii) entrepreneurial performance, of an ecosystem, 
in turn reflected by the target indicators policy makers believe have an (iii) impact on their 
ultimate policy objectives. This impact is the value generated by the ecosystem and 
entrepreneurship, while performance comprises indicators thought to reflect entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that other ‘flows’ are identified. For instances, although 
determinants affect the amount of entrepreneurial performance, which in turn influences 
impacts, such as economic growth, it is also true, impacts (economic growth) will affect 
determinants, by for example easing access to capital, through higher availability of capital. 
Nonetheless, the impact on such policy objectives is not always clear and exclusively affected 
by performance indicators. Thus, including impact indicators in the framework serves only to 
demonstrate the theory behind it. Moreover, it is important to highlight that indicators are to 
some extent mere proxies of entrepreneurship and that in some cases growth may not reflect 
entrepreneurship at all, but may occur due to hidden variables driving growth. No combination 
of measures is yet able to exactly capture the number and value of entrepreneurship levels. Yet, 
the usage of such indicators is part of a much-needed pragmatic approach to such a framework. 
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that government policy can address each market, systemic 
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may arise from a variety of factors, such as inadequate policy design, implementation or 
governance failure. However, finding out why policies may be ineffective is not part of this 






Although, the effects generated by policy reforms take time to accrue, they are expected to 
positively impact the regulatory environment. Nonetheless, some reforms have a direct short-
term impact on indicators reflecting the ecosystem’s regulatory rigidity, for instances, a reduced 
corporate income tax rate, it is “immediately felt”, as entrepreneurs will pay less taxes. 
However, its impact, for instances, on increasing the number of high growth companies, is not. 
Therefore, throughout the policy reform research, attention was placed on tracking reforms 
(Table 3) that would suggest a short-term impact on regulatory framework (fact-based) 
determinants (Table 2) and assure a long-term accrued impact on broader performance variables 
(e.g. Business population growth). This selection process was adopted, as an attempt to correct 
for the assumption that hidden factors may have also contributed to altering the values. Seeing 
that indicators’ values are collected based on observable facts, impact can be measured by the 
change in those factual values. For instances, the Cost of Starting a Business, which reflects 
official average costs of each procedure officially required, based on formal legislation, for an 
entrepreneur to start a business. Here, the cost of each procedure is official and changes in its 
value only occur if reforms are implemented directly to lower the cost of procedures X or Y, 
which in turn affects the average cost (of procedures) to start a business. 












After analysis, individual and cross-comparative results and conclusions are taken, to track 
differences and/or commonalities in their approaches to policy reforms and their outcomes, 
helping to assess the effectiveness of each country’s reforms. Lastly, policy reform 
effectiveness is estimated by its, (un)successful impact on short-term fact-based determinants 
(e.g. Nº of days required for starting a business) a year after the reform’s implementation.  
5. Database and Variables 
The information and data value sources used were extracted from the annual reports and online 
databases of the World Economic Forum, OECD, Eurostat and Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor for the period 2006-2016, for Portugal and the Netherlands. Moreover, they were 
obtained following the guidelines provided by the yearly OECD reports of “Entrepreneurship 
at a Glance”. To analyse their impact and effectiveness on the indicator values that measure 
regulatory frameworks’ rigidity, policy reforms were retrieved through the World Bank’s 
yearly Doing Business Reports, which collects hard data to compare economies’ business 
regulation for domestic firms, since 2003. These reports are formulated with the contribution 
of 13 000 specialists and leading scholars, to measure aspects of regulation affecting eleven 
areas of a business’s life, across 190 economies (in 2017). This measurement takes place by 
























































































Source: Doing Business Reports 2006-2015, OECD 
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cross-comparing, ranking and publishing indicator values reflecting the state of economies’ 
regulatory frameworks and by tracking policy reforms and regulatory procedures. 
Following the Framework’s Quality Assessment of indicators, no indicator with an overall 
quality grade below A (top-tier) was considered in policy reform impact, to use the most reliable 
and robust indicators available in the framework. This line of reasoning led to the dismissals of 
any domains with a low number of quality indicators, to attain the domain with the highest 
quality and facilitate data gathering, strength and availability across countries and time. As did 
the fact that by removing obstacles to establishment and growth of new ventures, the 
government helps and motivates potential entrepreneurs and ventures to take risks and succeed. 
Especially since for countries in crisis, fiscal distress makes economies more likely to 
implement regulatory reforms in the areas measured by Doing Business (Doing Business Report 
2018, World Bank). As a result, the regulatory framework domain was chosen. 
Moreover, the past decades, the focus on entrepreneurial policy has grown. As Storey and 
Greene (2010, p.208) put it “Ultimately, the ability of a country to nurture the growth of such 
businesses [high-growth ventures] is probably the most important element in enterprise 
development”. This is especially true since, a country’s regulations will impact businesses 
throughout the entirety of their lifecycle. For instances at start-up stage, entry and growth or 
labour market regulations may enhance or deter entrepreneur’s willingness to start a business 
and employ workers, as will tax policy affect ventures in their everyday operations. 
Finally, regarding the choosing of a comparative country, for benchmarking purposes and 
measuring common or different policy reform impact and effectiveness, the Netherlands were 
chosen due to both countries being member-states of the EU and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), per data availability and similarity to Portugal’s 
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performance on entrepreneurship-tracking rankings by renowned international institutions and 
because it’s considered to have somewhat better economic prospects than Portugal. 
6. Results  
Overall, Portugal has notoriously committed to reforming aspects of its regulation to simplify 
the requirements for creating and operating new ventures, to motivate national and foreign 
entrepreneurship and venture creation in its society. Although not all policies were effective in 
easing regulatory burdens, such as the majority of Court and Legal Framework, Labour Market 
and Bankruptcy Regulations reforms, most of Portuguese reforms were successful in their 
objectives. Accounting for 16 of the 30, the reforms targeted at easing Administrative Burdens 
(entry and growth) and Business/Capital Taxes, were the most effective and major drivers of 
the notorious improvement of the Portuguese entrepreneurial ecosystem’s regulatory 
framework. Moreover, Portugal was among the top-reformers throughout the period analysed, 
according to the OECD’s measuring method. The same, however, cannot be said for the 
Netherlands, which not only has not been a top reformer between 2006-2015, failing to invest 
in reforming several regulatory aspects of businesses’ life (e.g. Court and Legal Framework; 
Bankruptcy Regulations), but has also proven that around half of its reforms were ineffective 
in easing regulatory barriers. This discrepancy between country’s size of investments and 
commitment in reforming regulatory framework can be seen in the previously shown Table 3. 
Throughout 2006 to 2013, Portuguese reforms targeted at reducing ventures Administrative 
Burdens of entry (Starting a Business), were found to be amongst the most effective. While in 
2006 starting a business required at least 7,5 days, during which 8 procedures had to be 
performed and approved, each costing on average 7,9% (of GNI per capita) and a paid-in 
minimum capital requirement of 38,7% to be deposited in a bank before company registration. 
By 2013, the reforms implemented allowed companies to start up in 2,5 days, taking up to 3 
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procedures with an average cost of 2,5% each, with no paid-in minimum capital requirement. 
In the meantime, in the Netherlands, businesses starting in 2013 had to wait at least 3,5 days 
for 4 procedures to be processed, also without paid-in minimum capital requirements. In this 
domain, the Dutch only implemented two reforms, both effective and similar to Portuguese 
ones (Table 4). 






Clearly, this easing of regulatory procedures’ complexity and costs at the initial stage of 
ventures lifecycle, reduces the burden it imposes on entrepreneurs in their consideration of 
whether to start-up. Here, both countries’ reforms were effective. However, with the nature of 
the ministry and its implied differences in procedural complexity per country, no inference 
seemed reasonable as to which of the countries was more effective in reforming. 
After registering the business, a founder’s next step will be dealing with construction permits. 
The procedures, time and cost spent when engaging in the construction of your business 
facilities are a direct measure of administrative burdens that can arise during a business 
operation. For 5 consecutive years, Portugal invested in the use of technology and streamlining 
of inspection systems to simplify and speed up procedures. In 2006, dealing with facility 
construction took 350 days, 16 procedures and it cost 1,9% of the facility value. With the yearly 
reforms, until 2012, only 14 procedures were required with a cost of 1,4% and 118 days. The 
reduction in the days entrepreneurs would take to meet these requirements, alone is a major 
relief of administrative burdens at entry level of great relevance.  






Before (t) After (t+1) 
PRT Abolishing paid-in minimum capital 
requirement (mcp) to be deposited in 
the bank prior to venture registration 
Mcp2010=34,1% Mcp2011=0 
NLD Mcp2012= 49,4% Mcp2013=0 
 
PRT Eliminating requirement to report to 
the Ministry of Labour 
#days2012 = 5; 
#procedures2012 = 5 
#days2013 = 2,5; 
#procedures2013 = 3 
 
NLD 
Eliminating requirement of Ministry 
of Justice approval before 
incorporation 
#days2011 = 8; 
#procedures2011 = 6 
 
#days2012 = 5; 




However, one year of reforms is worth highlighting. Whilst in 2007, Portugal allowed online 
applications for building permits, assigned officers to each application and simplified approvals 
(Table 5), the country also tried to increase quality-controlling mechanisms of labour market 
regulation by adding a new procedure for inspection during construction. These reforms were 
found ineffective due to contradictory goals of two policies, one simplifying the other 
increasing procedures. As a result, not only was no improvement noticed, but both the number 
of days and procedures went up by one, with the harmful outweighing the beneficial. 
Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, again only two reforms took place regarding construction 
permits, however one had no impact felt in the indicators reflecting this type of burden (Table 
5). Thus, the reform was deemed ineffective, as was the Portuguese one in this area. 
In this case it is easy to understand, from simple comparison, that the Dutch reform was more 
effective in easing regulatory burden, without aiming at two conflicting policy outcomes. 






Nonetheless, Portugal more than doubled the Dutch reforms, representing a higher investment 
on the country’s side. Moreover, aside from the first reform, all the subsequent were effective 
in easing dealing with construction permits. So effective that it became quicker to complete the 
process in Portugal than in the Netherlands during the 2006-2015 period, although Portugal still 
requires 1 procedure more, the number of days favours Portugal around 50. 
Country Reform Objective 
Reform Outcome 
Before (t) After (t+1) 
PRT 
Simplifying approvals and 
implementing an online 
application system for building 
permits 
#days2007 = 350; 
#procedures2007 = 16 
#days2008 = 351; 
#procedures2008 = 17 
 
NLD 
#days2011 = 179,5; 
#procedures2011 = 14 
#days2012 = 161; 
#procedures2012 = 13 
 
NLD 
Improving construction regulation 
process by implementing a new 
spatial planning law 
#days2008 = 179,5; 
#procedures2008 = 14 
#days2009 = 179,5; 
#procedures2009 = 14 
 Data Source: OECD t=year of reform implementation 
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Similarly, Portugal committed more to easing the property registry process than the Dutch. The 
latter reformed once by increasing process efficiency, which accounts for the only value change 
in the analysed period, reducing the minimum waiting period to finish registry from 5,5 days to 
2,5. Comparatively, in 2006, it was more complex to register property in Portugal. Although 
the same number of 5 procedures were required, the Dutch dealt with them in 5,5 days while 
the Portuguese did it in 81. With a focus on technology and digitalization, and despite earlier 
reforms reducing the days to 12, it is the 2009 implementation of ‘one-stop-shops’ for property 
registry that allows Portugal to outperform the Netherlands in this area. By 2010, property could 
be registered in one day through one procedure in Portugal. 
Although no inference on comparative policy reform effectiveness can be performed, due to 
differences in investment, we can ascertain the effectiveness of the Portuguese reforms in this 
domain. The easing of the property registration process has previously been demonstrated to 
drive business start-up and job creation.13 Moreover, such a significant reduction in 
administrative fees and simplification of incorporation procedures, is of a major contribution to 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem’s attractiveness. 
Entrepreneurship development is based on a trial-and-error basis, thus the matching of 
employees with the entrepreneur’s values, skills and other criteria might take a few trials to get 
right. Therefore, the legal framework and particularly the easing of legal contract enforcement 
should also be a focus of policy makers. As such, the Portuguese policy makers are no 
exception, whilst the Dutch are, failing to reform contract enforcement (2006-2016). 
Nevertheless, aside from 2008, the Portuguese failed to improve contract enforcement through 
policy reform, with some indicator values stagnating others deteriorating. (Table 6) 
                                                          
13 Brasntetter et al., 2010 show that a previous Portuguese reform setting up one-stop-shops, increased 
the number of business start-ups by 17% and created 7 new jobs per 100 000 county inhabitants per 












Whilst in 2006, the Portuguese courts could legally resolve contract enforcements in at least 
495 days through 24 procedures, by 2013 the same process took 547 days and 34 procedures. 
These are clear signs of ineffective policy reforms and increased rigidity of these regulatory 
burdens, which may deter or restrict entrepreneurial employment. Similarly, the Labour Market 
reforms implemented throughout the analysed decade, were also of significant ineffectiveness, 










The Dutch implemented only one reform in 2015, similar to the Portuguese one of the same 
year (Table 7), which translated into a deterioration of the DHI14 by 17 points in 2016. 
                                                          
14 Difficulty (or Flexibility) of Hiring/Firing Indexes measure whether laws and regulations imply barriers or 
difficulties of hiring/firing a standard worker in a standard company. The Rigidity of hours index measures the 
rigidity of working overtime (OECD-Eurostat, 2016) 
Country Reform Objective 
Reform Outcome 
Before (t) After (t+1) 
 
PRT 
Simplifying rules for small claims and 
improving management case system 
#days2006 = 495; 
#procedures2006 = 24 
#days2007 = 577; 
#procedures2007 = 35 
 
PRT 
Reducing procedural complexity by 
raising monetary limit for cases going 
through summary proceedings 
#days2007 = 577; 
#procedures2007 = 35 
#days2008 = 830; 
#procedures2008 = 34 
 
PRT 
Reducing time and improving procedures 
for contract enforcement by allowing 
electronic filling for suit initiation 
#days2008 = 830; 
#procedures2008 = 34 
#days2009 = 547; 
#procedures2009 = 31 
PRT 
Adopting new code of civil procedure, to 
reduce case backlogs, streamline court 
procedures, enhance role of judges and 
speed up dispute resolutions 
#days2013 = 547; 
#procedures2013 = 34 
#days2014 = 547; 
#procedures2014 = 34 
 Data Source: OECD t=year of reform implementation 
Table 6 – Impact of Portuguese Policy Reforms in Contract Enforcement 
DHI/DFI -Difficulty of Hiring/Firing Index; RHI – Rigidity of Hours Index  Data Source: OECD 
t=year of reform implementation 
Country Reform Objective 
Reform Outcome 












Increasing notice period for redundancy dismissals and 
the max. cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts 
(t=2008) 
No indicator value change was noticed 





Increasing max. duration of fixed-term contracts and 
reducing the severance pay in redundancy dismissals 
(t=2011) 
No indicator value change was noticed 
Reducing wage premium for weekly holiday work and 





Reducing the severance pay per year of service and 
increasing maximum duration of fixed-term contracts 
DHI2013=61 DHI2014=44,3 
Introducing priority rules for redundancy dismissals 
and regulations for collective bargaining agreements 
RHI2014=35,7 RHI2015=42,6 
Reducing the max. duration of fixed-term contracts 
(t=2015) 
No indicator value change was noticed 
 
*(higher values imply a more rigid regulation in Labour market) 
 




Overall, labour market policy reform ineffectiveness is seen in both countries, which should be 
a major concern for policy makers, since the indicators measured, directly or indirectly, impact 
venture creation and development. For instances, if minimum wage increases and wage 
employment becomes more attractive, not only does labour become more expensive but so does 
the opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur.  
Moreover, the importance of a country’s tax regime is obvious for entrepreneurs, since they 
have a direct impact on the supply of capital. High taxation discourages entrepreneurs, who see 
their potential benefits reduced and investors who see their returns decrease by high levels of 
taxation. Therefore, policy initiatives targeted at declining capital taxation or increasing 
investment incentives contribute to a more attractive entrepreneurial environment/ecosystem. 
Both Portugal (Table 8) and the Netherlands (Table 9), have focused on improving their tax 
















Country Reform Objective 
Reform Outcome 










Reducing taxes, mainly CIT and 
social security contribution rates 
CIT2006 = 29,6%; 
Rev. of CIT Taxation2006 = 3,45%; 
SME Tax Rate2006 = 25,5%; 
Nº of days for paying Taxes2006 = 250 
CIT2007 = 25,5%; 
Rev. of CIT Taxation2007 = 3,43%; 
SME Tax Rate2007 = 20%; 
Nº of days for paying Taxes2007 = 180 
Reducing frequency of filling and 
paying VAT 
Nº of days for paying taxes2009 = 164 Nº of days for paying taxes2010 = 131 
Increasing employer paid labour 
contributions, road and polder board 
taxes 
(t=2014) 
No direct impact on Capital and Business Taxes Determinants 
Lowering rates for employer health 
insurance contributions and 
improving online system for paying 
CIT 
Nº of days for paying taxes2015 = 120 Nº of days for paying taxes2016 = 119 
 Data Source: OECD t=year of reform implementation 
Table 9 – Impact of Policy Reforms on Capital/Business Taxes Determinants 
Country Reform Objective 
Reform Outcome 









Reducing Corporate Income Tax Rate (CIT) 
CIT2006 = 27,5%; 
Revenue of CIT Taxation 2006 
= 2,83% 
CIT2007 = 25%; 
Rev. of CIT Taxation 2007 
=3,46% 
Introducing new social security code and 
amending tax brackets. Taxable income up to 
€12 500 became subject to half the rate 
(12,5%) 
Nº of days required for paying 
taxes2009 = 328 
Nº of days required for 
paying taxes2010 = 298 
Reducing CIT and tax rate for a portion of 
the taxable profits of qualifying SMEs 
CIT2013 = 25%; 
Rev. of CIT Taxation 2013 
=3,26% 
CIT2014 = 23%; 
Rev. of CIT Taxation 2014 
=2,84% 
Reducing CIT and increasing the allowable 
amount of the loss carried forward 
CIT2014 = 23%; 
Rev. of CIT Taxation 2014 
=2,84% 
CIT2015 = 21%; 
Rev. of CIT Taxation 2015 
=3,16% 
Reducing CIT, implementing better 
accounting software and enhancing online 
filling system of taxes 
Nº of days required for paying 
taxes2015 = 275 
Nº of days required for 
paying taxes2016 = 243 
 Data Source: OECD t=year of reform implementation 
Table 8 – Impact of Policy Reforms on Capital/Business Taxes Determinants 
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Regarding taxation burdens, we can see that Portugal has consistently focused on reducing the 
Corporate Income Tax rates and creating special taxation classes for small-and-medium 
enterprises. Plus, efforts have also been made reducing the number of days required to pay 
taxes, from 328 (2006) to 243 (2016) (Table 9). Here, the reduction of venture operation costs, 
specially income taxes, is a clear improvement of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, by 
incentivizing entrepreneurs through the relief of tax burdens. This coupled with the reduced 
time to pay taxes, translates into a lower opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur. 
On the Dutch side, this policy area was the most invested one in the period analysed and its 
reforms the most effective. Although not much focus was given to reducing CIT, the country 
greatly reduced the time required to pay taxes, similarly to the Portuguese use of online 
technology, from 250 days to 119 in a decade. Here, the implementation of online systems was 
more effective in Portugal reducing time in 32 days, while the Dutch only achieved 1 less day. 
Across countries, the reforms diverged in their targets but most were effective in alleviating 
taxation burdens, although its faster to pay taxes in the Netherlands, the tax paid is also higher.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
Concluding, the easing of regulatory rigidity affecting regular business operations throughout 
their lifecycle was achieved, in Portugal, during 2006-2016, by successful reforms in easing the 
regulatory requirements of starting a business, dealing with building permits, registering 
property and tax regulation. These gave more appeal to the Portuguese regulatory framework 
by making it easier and less costly for entrepreneurs to set up shop and operate in Portugal. 
Whilst in 2006, overall (i.e. ease of doing business index, OECD) Portugal underperformed the 
Netherlands, by 2016 the tables had turned. Thanks, to its commitment to reforming regulatory 
framework, Portugal was also able to outperform the Netherlands in the rigidity of dealing with 
construction permits and registering property, where the most notorious improvements took 
place. The Dutch were also surpassed in easiness of legal contract enforcement, although here 
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the merit does not seem to come for Portuguese efforts, as reforms in this area were highly 
ineffective, but from the fault of the Dutch, failing to reform this area during the analysed 
decade, seeing its rank deteriorate. On the other hand, the Netherlands, surpassed Portugal in 
easiness to start a business and deal with capital and business taxes, despite Portugal’s 
improvement, the Dutch was higher. 
Overall, we can derive that quality-before-quantity of policy reforms gives greater contribution 
to the ecosystem’s attractiveness. Although, Portugal had much higher levels of investment in 
reforming its regulatory environment, a few quality and effective reforms were enough for the 
Netherlands to surpass Portugal in the aforementioned areas, but where the country failed to 
reform Portugal outperformed. As seen from this analysis, policy makers should also not fail to 
reform areas of their countries’ regulatory frameworks. In today’s world where every country 
is investing in improving its competitive position in the global marketplace, it is crucial to take 
an ecosystem’s holistic approach to policy reform and not just focus on a few aspects of 
regulatory areas or a few actors of the ecosystem, but rather all of them. 
Finally, the methodology used in this paper proves to be practical and representative of the 
impact of regulatory framework policy reforms, for the available data. Although the overall 
exact value contribution of policy reforms to countries’ economies cannot yet be given by 
methodologies such as this one, the contribution to the embellishment of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem can be measured. Thus, following the rationale that a more attractive entrepreneurial 
will drive up entrepreneurship, which in turn drives economic growth, allows to infer that 
contributions to the improvement of a countries’ entrepreneurial ecosystem, such as the easing 
of its regulatory framework, will eventually lead to improvements in economic outlooks. 
However, to create better conditions for reform effectiveness, policymakers must address 
regulatory complexity by clearly defining its objectives and effectively communicating them, 
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